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A Historian's View of the International Freedom of Expression 
Framework  
Antoon De Baets
The international freedom of expression framework as established by 
the United Nations in recent decades has been the accumulated and 
sophisticated result of philosophical and legal thinking since the 
Enlightenment, if not earlier.  The framework is an integral part of the 
international human rights system and it is shared almost worldwide, albeit 
with some regional variations. It is common inside legal circles, but less 
well-known outside of it. This is regrettable as the framework provides 
standards to discuss the merits of different law types and offers criteria to 
evaluate arguments in discussions about free expression, information and 
secrecy. Scholars outside the legal realm need to develop their own reading 
of it. Therefore, I shall approach it here, by way of illustration, from the 
particular angle of my own profession, history. It goes without saying that 
many history-related remarks are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to other 
scholarship as well. I provide only an outline of the framework, although 
many of its parts merit in-depth treatment.
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The Standards
The standards that regulate the universal right to freedom of opinion and 
expression on a global scale are written down in articles 19 and 20 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR is a 
formal elaboration of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It 
was approved by the United Nations in 1966 and as of June 2016 ratified by 
168 states (representing 80% of the world population).1 Article 19.1 
describes the formation of opinions, article 19.2 their expression, article 19.3
their restriction, and article 20 their prohibition.
Article 19 ICCPR:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
1 See http:// indicators.ohchr.org. Countries that have not yet ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) include China, Cuba, Malaysia, Myanmar and 
Saudi Arabia.
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(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.
Article 20 ICCPR
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited 
by law.
If we are to interpret these two articles, we need the guidance of the 
Human Rights Committee, a United Nations body established in 1976 to 
supervise compliance with the ICCPR by the states parties (the ratifying 
states). One of the Committee’s tasks is to issue authoritative 
interpretations of the various ICCPR articles. In 2011, it produced a General 
Comment on article 19, which will be our main guide here. 2 In introducing 
the freedoms of opinion and expression, the Committee recalled why they 
are so important for individuals, for society and for the state:
[They] are indispensable conditions for the full development of the 
person…They constitute the foundation stone for every free and 
democratic society… Freedom of expression is a necessary condition 
for the realization of the principles of transparency and accountability 
that are, in turn, essential for the promotion and protection of human
rights.3
2 Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 34 [on the freedoms of opinion and 
expression) (2011). The principal drafter of this General Comment was HRC member 
Michael O’Flaherty, professor at the National University of Ireland in Galway. General 
Comment 34 replaces General Comment 10 [on freedom of expression] (1983). See also 
General Comment 11 [on the prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial 
or religious hatred] (1983).
3 HRC, General Comment 34, §§2–3.
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If we read these rationales with the eyes of the historian, we note that 
the idea of history is tacitly but completely immersed in them in two 
respects. First, everyone needs to somehow reflect on the past in order to 
achieve full personal development. Second, history as a craft, as long as it is
done responsibly, helps foment a democratic society, among others because 
historical information can inform important political debates and therefore 
contribute to achieving government transparency and accountability.4
Article 19.1: The Formation of Opinions
Article 19.1 establishes the right to hold opinions. Two principles 
underpinning its logic are of utmost importance to historical writing. The first
is the right to form and hold historical opinions (that is, interpretations of 
past events and moral judgments about the conduct of historical figures). 
The Human Rights Committee observed:
Paragraph 1 of article 19 requires protection of the right to hold 
opinions without interference. This is a right to which the Covenant 
permits no exception or restriction … All forms of opinion are 
protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or
religious nature.5
This commentary emphasizes the absolute and non-derogable right to 
hold opinions, including those of a historical nature. The second principle is 
the non-coercion principle. In the words of the Committee:
4 Antoon De Baets, “Democracy and Historical Writing,” Historiografías / Historiographies no.
9 (June 2015): 31–43, https://unizar.es/historiografias/numeros/9/debaets.pdf
5 HRC, General Comment 34, §9.
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Any form of effort to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion 
is prohibited.6
Coercion is inconsistent with the freedom to hold opinions. In other words, 
from a human rights perspective, historians are not obliged to adopt the 
interpretations of past events or the moral judgments about the conduct of 
historical figures made by others; and citizens in general are not obliged to 
comply with a duty to remember imposed on them by others.7
Article 19.2: The Expression of Opinions
Whereas article 19.1 focuses on the individual as such, article 19.2 
focuses on the individual in a social context. It establishes the right to 
freedom of information and expression. This is a right of persons looking for 
information and ideas (“seek”), persons expressing opinions (“impart”), and 
the public interested in hearing them (“receive”). Here, a third principle 
emerges, the right to err. According to the Committee:
The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of 
an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.8
6 HRC, General Comment 34, §10. The quote continues: “Freedom to express one’s opinion 
necessarily includes freedom not to express one’s opinion.” See also article 18.2 ICCPR; 
HRC, General Comment 22 [on freedom of thought] (1993), §5.
7 See for a full discussion, Antoon De Baets, Responsible History (New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn, 2009), chapter 5 (“The Rights to Memory and History”). The non-coercion 
principle is also stated in article 18.2 ICCPR.
8 HRC, General Comment 34, §49. This right to err echoes the views of John Stuart Mill, who
in 1859 argued that erroneous and false opinions are valuable because they challenge 
disbelievers to refute them in order to come closer to the truth. In the process, some of the 
supposedly erroneous or false information could turn out to be true after all. John Stuart 
Mill, On Liberty (London: Parker & Sons, 1859), chapter 2.
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This right to err refers to opinions and less so to facts. Statements of fact 
are indeed distinguished from statements of opinion. From a human rights 
perspective, historical facts are susceptible to a truth/falsity proof while 
historical opinions are not. This distinction between facts and opinions is an 
important fundament of legal epistemology. It means that expressing 
opinions enjoys a far stronger protection than expressing statements of fact.
Article 19.3: The Restriction of Opinions
Article 19.3 embodies the idea that the right to freedom of expression, 
although universal, is not absolute. It describes the standards to permissibly 
restrict free expression.9 Four general principles underlie these standards. 
First, restricting a right in order to protect it is delicate and, therefore, the 
scope of restrictions on free expression is itself restricted and should never 
undermine the essence of the right.10 Second, only states may permissibly 
restrict free expression. Third, the exercise of the free expression right 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. This clause is first and 
foremost applicable to the state. States have responsibilities to respect (that
is, not interfering with the free expression when it is not necessary), to 
9 See for the restriction principles, in particular, United Nations (UN) Economic and Social 
Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1985), part I, and Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
(A/HRC/14/23; 2010), §§72–87, especially §79. See also Toby Mendel, Restricting Freedom
of Expression: Standards and Principles (Halifax: Centre for Law and Democracy, 2011) and
“Themes and Issues,” in Information, Freedom and Censorship: World Report 1991, edited 
by Article 19 (London: Library Association Publishing, 1991), 409–440, for discussion.
10 See also article 5 ICCPR.
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protect (that is, preventing private actors from interfering with the free 
expression of others) and to fulfill (that is, facilitating free expression by 
means of legal, financial, promotional and other measures).11 Historians, in 
their turn, have also duties that come with the exercise of the right to free 
expression — for example, the duty not to express discriminatory views 
when they act as symbols of authority in a teaching context.12 Fourth, the 
standards are applicable at all times, including times of public emergency, 
although states may then take temporary measures derogating from their 
responsibilities under strict conditions.13
The Three-Part Test
Based on these principles, a sophisticated method to assess the 
appropriateness of restrictions on free expression was developed. It is 
internationally accepted and best known as “the three-part test.”14 The first 
branch of the test prescribes that the restriction should be “provided by 
law.” In order to understand this branch of the test, we should first have a 
grasp of the rule of law. According to the United Nations:
11 See also article 2.2 ICCPR.
12 See HRC, Ross v Canada (736/1997) (2000), §11.6: “[T]he Committee recalls that the 
exercise of … freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities. These 
… are of particular relevance within the school system, especially with regard to the 
teaching of young students … [T]he influence exerted by school teachers may justify 
restraints in order to ensure that legitimacy is not given by the school system to the 
expression of views which are discriminatory.” See also European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), Gollnisch v France (48135/08) (2011), 12, 14.
13 See article 4.1 ICCPR and Siracusa Principles, part II.
14 Also called “triple test” or “justification test.”
7
De Baets: A Historian's View
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2016
The “rule of law” … refers to a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, 
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.15
A focal part of the rule of law is legality. The central idea of the legality 
principle is that restrictions on free expression cannot be imposed by the 
whims of a public official on the spot; they should be enshrined in pre-
existing laws which are consistent with international human rights standards.
Furthermore, laws imposing restrictions must be publicly accessible (they 
cannot be secret), and described in clear, precise and unambiguous 
language, so that everyone can understand them. They should also be 
equally enforced. Laws containing vague and overbroad formulations expand
the range of persons permitted to implement them, give them too much 
power, create uncertainty and arbitrariness and produce a chilling effect (a 
deterring effect) on free expression.16 In its General Comment 34, the 
15 UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies (S/2004/616) (2004), §6. See also http://un.org/en/ruleoflaw and 
data.worldjusticeproject.org. The definition of rule of law is inspired by, among others, 
article 8 of the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789) and Lon Fuller’s 
classic The Morality of Law (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), 33–94, 
discussing eight requirements for legality: generality; promulgation; non-retroactivity; 
clarity; non-contradiction; capability of being obeyed; constancy through time; congruence 
between law declared and law administered. About unjust laws, read Franz Kafka, The Trial 
(originally in German, 1925).
16 Article 15 ICCPR emphasizes one element of the legality principle: the prohibition of 
retroactive application of criminal laws (nullum crimen sine lege). No one may be convicted 
for an act or an omission that did not constitute a criminal offence under national law (both 
statutory and common-law norms) or international law (both treaty and customary law) at 
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Human Rights Committee expressed concern over several law types that 
may threaten free expression, including national security laws, memory 
laws, blasphemy laws, hate speech laws and genocide denial laws and many 
others.
It is also well-known that most dictatorships invest much energy in 
keeping up a semblance of legality in a contorted attempt to enhance their 
legitimacy.17 Often, they function under a martial law regime. But dictatorial 
decrees do not meet the legality principle. Some blatantly prescribe an 
entire ideology, others facilitate the persecution of dissidents or the ban on 
their publications under the guise of national security or anti-terrorism laws. 
Still others are secret laws, laws with secret interpretations or laws with 
overbroad secrecy regulations or blanket amnesties granting immunity for 
perpetrators of human rights violations. These unjust laws, or their 
remnants, sometimes survive in democracies.
The second branch of the test enumerates a list of legitimate interests 
(or aims) on which free expression restrictions can be based. These interests
can be private (the respect of the rights or reputations of others) or public 
(the protection of national security, of public order, of public health and of 
public morals). Among the private interests, reputation is straightforward, 
the time it was committed. This means that a person may be prosecuted if accused of acts 
that were criminal under international law when they were committed, even if these were 
not defined as criminal under national law at the time. The latter is emphasized in article 
15.2 ICCPR, according to which prosecution is possible “for any act or omission which, at 
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations [italics adb].”
17 See, for example, Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 130–131.
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but the catch-all expression “rights of others” is less clear. In various legal 
cases, it has been understood to include, among others, the rights to 
copyright, to privacy and to equality. The phrase has also been invoked to 
protect the honor and dignity of genocide victims (deceased and surviving) 
and their relatives and descendants.18 The “rights of others” relate to both 
individuals and the community as a whole.
The public interests mentioned in article 19.3 ICCPR are generally 
recognized as legitimate for the survival and functioning of society and the 
state (the latter as the legal and political manifestation of society). National 
security should be understood as the protection of:
[T]he existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political 
independence against force or threat of force.19
This includes the possibility to shield sensitive information from the public.
Public order should ideally be:
[T]he sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the set 
of fundamental principles on which society is founded. Respect for 
human rights is part of public order.20
The interest of public health (the third public interest) does not play a major 
role in the study of the past. In contrast, the interest of public morals 
certainly does. The Siracusa Principles that clarify the concept stipulate:
Since public morality varies over time and from one culture to 
another, a state which invokes public morality as a ground for 
18 See ECHR, Perinçek v Switzerland (27510/08) (2015), §§143–144, 155–157.
19 Siracusa Principles, §29.
20 Siracusa Principles, §22; see also ECHR, Perinçek, §§146–154.
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restricting human rights, while enjoying a certain margin of 
discretion, shall demonstrate that the limitation in question is 
essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the
community. The margin of discretion left to states does not apply to 
the rule of non-discrimination as defined in the Covenant [the ICCPR, 
adb].21
Expressing the same non-discrimination idea, the Human Rights Committee
itself observed that:
[T]he concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and 
religious traditions; consequently, limitations … for the purpose of 
protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving 
exclusively from a single tradition.22
Significantly, the list of private and public interests is exclusive. Other 
interests than the ones listed in article 19.3 are not permissible as restriction
grounds. As the Human Rights Committee tells us:
[I]t is not compatible with the Covenant for a restriction to be 
enshrined in traditional, religious or other such customary law.23
This means that free expression restrictions in the name of “tradition,” 
“custom,” “culture,” or in the name of “national pride,” “protection of 
memory” or “insult to the fatherland” should all be discarded as invalid.24
21 Siracusa Principles, §§27−28.
22 HRC, General Comment 22, §8 and General Comment 34, §32.
23 HRC, General Comment 34, §24, also §32. See also Joint Declaration on Universality and 
the Right to Freedom of Expression (2014), §§1b, 1f.
24 For the protection of tradition, see Graeme Reid, “The Trouble with Tradition: When 
‘Values’ Trample Over Rights,” in World Report 2013, edited by Human Rights Watch 
(Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 20–28. For the protection of memory, see 
Article 19, Memorandum on the Russian Draft Federal Law “On Combating the Rehabilitation
of Nazism, Nazi Criminals or their Collaborators in the Newly Independent States Created on
the Territory of Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (London: Article 19, 2009), 13.
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The third branch of the test prescribes that restrictions should be 
“necessary” to achieve the protection of the interests. The necessity principle
stipulates that the restriction must address a pressing social need.25 The 
proportionality principle, a part of the necessity principle, defines two other 
conditions: the benefit flowing from the restriction must outweigh the harm 
it does to free expression and the restriction which was selected should be 
the least intrusive measure available. Restrictions that are “unnecessary” or 
“disproportional” (for example, harsh sanctions) produce chilling effects that 
may unduly restrict free expression of the person concerned and others.26
The three-part test has stood the test of time. If states fail the test, a 
violation of the right to free expression has occurred.
Article 20: The Prohibition of Opinions
Article 20 of ICCPR is an extension of article 19.3. Whereas article 19.3 is 
about restricting opinions, article 20 is about prohibiting them. Strictly 
speaking, the acts prohibited under article 20 are not even considered as 
opinions. In the words of the Human Rights Committee: 
[F]or  the acts  addressed in article  20,  the Covenant  indicates  the
specific response required from the State: their prohibition by law. It
is  only  to  this  extent  that  article  20  may  be  considered  as  lex
specialis with regard to article 19.27
25 In Europe, the usual formula is “necessary in a democratic society.”
26 See also HRC, General Comment 34, §§34–35.
27 HRC, General Comment 34, §51.
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This means that governments have a duty to enact laws prohibiting war 
propaganda (article 20.1 ICCPR) and laws prohibiting “any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence” (or hate speech for short) (article 20.2 
ICCPR).
Epilogue
This is, in a nutshell, the international free expression framework 
insofar as it is relevant for the problems of historians. The framework is a 
coherent whole of fundamental principles, all of which have to be carefully 
balanced against one another. It can be used to discuss those laws that 
directly aim at restricting what historians say or write about the past and to 
test arguments about the role of history and archives in discussions about 
free expression, information and secrecy.
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